your mind is no doubt drifting towards the upcoming pitchers and catchers report date (february 18th!).

and while roy oswalt waits to see if the cardinals can convince the local pawn shop/check cashing place to give them at least $2m for kyle mcclellan, there seems to be precious little else to discuss in the way of the roster.

but there are some upcoming changes in the way the sport of baseball is to be run. since i needed to sit down with the new CBA (which, funnily enough, still does not seem to be posted online). however, the good people at MLB put some intern on the task of reading through a gigantic block of legalese, digesting it, and regurgitating a semi-readable Cliffs Notes version.

mlb gone wild

as you probably know, the league wants to introduce a second wild card team in each league. the two teams will face off in a single game to determine which of the two will proceed to play in the four-team LDS we are more familiar with. i think this will probably be at best a lateral move for mlb. as some people point out, it does create an incentive to finish first in your division. there's less chance that people will just forget to care about their division race in september. there have been in the past a lot of divisions where the 1-2 are close (think red sox/yankees; braves/phillies; texas/angels) but the #2 team will get the wild card anyway, so who cares by the end of september? on the other hand, you'll lose the converse drama associated with inter-division wild card races (think cards-braves last year) or even intra-division (rays-red sox last year). i guess i just hate the idea of a 1-game playoff deciding anything other than a pure tie in a division or wild card race.

the other thing to track is that the CBA mandates that the new wild card system be in place no later than the 2013 season. "no later than" potentially includes the 2012 season, and bud selig is hard at work to make that happen this year.

surprising nobody, the winner in this new system will surely be the coffers of whoever gets to broadcast these two games and, by extension, major league baseball for the fees it will get.

other scheduling and realignment issues

the astros leave the NL Central for the AL West in 2013. you know this already.

and having two leagues of 15 teams means season-long interleague. to the extent that changes how the game is played, note that it was easier during a defined interleague season for a national league team to bring up a DH-type from the minors briefly. since our DH-types tended to be nick stavinoha or mark hamilton, this will have almost no effect on us at all, because both hamilton and stavinoha have thus far been terrible at everything including DHing.

i would imagine most AL teams were previously unable to make the converse adjustment (briefly demote an offense-first player for a strong defender from the minors) because they likely have DHs and 1Bs that they are unwilling or unable to demote during interleague play anyway, so the changed interleague schedule probably has a modest negative effect on the national league. like we needed a further handicap.

luckily, this doesn't start till 2013, so matt adams will maybe get a chance to see if he can outdo hamilton or stavinoha.

compensatory picks

you've probably heard much of this but some of it's important and has not been emphasized.

- no more type A or type B picks or Elias rankings. requiescat in pace, stupid ranks.

- only players who've been with the offering team all season will create an opportunity for compensatory picks. if a trade occurs, nobody will get a pick. on the other hand, if a team knows it lacks the money or interest to make an offer to the player giving rise to compensatory picks, the team will be better off getting what it can and making a trade for another team's prospects instead of letting the player walk at the end of the season.

- instead of the Elias ranks and offers of arbitration, a team seeking a draft pick must 1) make an offer within 5 days of the world series; 2) the offer must be a guaranteed one-year contract for more than the 125th highest paying salary(ed: the average of the top 125 salaries: for 2012, $12.5m) from the previous year; 3) the player must have 7 days to accept.

- any club signing a player who declines an offer outlined above loses first round pick; however, nobody loses a top ten pick (formerly top 15). teams with top ten picks will lose its next pick, even if it comes in the compensatory round..

- any club whose player signs with another team after making the offer outlined above will get a compensatory round pick.

(ed: - also, teams will have a protected pick for two years, rather than one year; that is if a drafted player fails to sign, the club gets that pick again the following year; if a player drafted in that slot again fails to sign, the team gets a third chance before losing the pick entirely).

it's clear from the new compensatory pick system that the whole purpose is to keep mid-range and high-range contract values and lengths from exploding. if you're an owner, it doesn't do you any good to limit octavio dotel to a one-year deal in arbitration for pretty much what he was going to make in free agency. and it makes no sense (from the owners' perspectives) to reward teams for keeping octavio dotel off the free agent market. keeping the salaries and contract lengths of bigger dollar players will keep the salaries in check, they hope.

i'm sure there won't be any kind of offer that will make joey votto think about taking a one-year deal after 2013, but next year's edwin jackson or jimmy rollins may have to think hard when he gets a pretty substantial one-year offer right after the world series about the chance he's taking by testing the free agent market. and that seems to be the aim. assuming the intent of the prior system was to encourage players to accept offers of arbitration, it was a miserable failure based on the tiny numbers of free agents who actually accepted offers of arbitration every year.

competitive balance lottery

the other way for clubs to do well in the number of picks they get is to win the lottery. seriously. there will be this very strangely devised lottery for small-market, low-revenue clubs to get a chance at one of six slots at the end of the first round, with the lottery probability dictated by winning percentage. all clubs who receive revenue sharing funds (who did not win one of the 6 slots in the first round) will compete in a similar lottery for one of six slots at the end of the second round.

i presume that this is intended to do what the name says and improve the parity of clubs within MLB. i don't think that st. louis qualifies as either among the 10 lowest revenue or 10 smallest market teams, although i'd be interested to see how those terms are defined. (ed.: i am now hearing that the stl may qualify as one of the 10 smallest markets). however, i would imagine that pittsburgh, milwaukee, and cincinnati might all be in the running for those picks. the lottery doesn't seem likely to upend the division, but it may have some effect over the next years.

super 2 eligibility

the number of club-controlled players eligible for super 2 status will increase from the top 17% in service time to the top 22% in service time. will that cause clubs to push back top prospect debuts even further?

rule 4 draft

every team will now get a slot-based "pool" for how much they can spend in the top 10 rounds, calculated relative to how many picks they have and how high those picks are. the cardinals, with 6 picks in the top 100 will have a relatively generous cap. the cardinals can spend up to the cap on all their picks through the 10th round. it doesn't matter how it is distributed within that group; they can spend $100,000 on a first round pick and $1m on a 10th round pick. as long as they don't spend more in total in the top 10 rounds than is in their pool, there will be no penalty. the ideal is that teams will pay slot for everybody. whether teams obey that kind of logic is yet to be seen.

there are huge penalties for paying more than is in your "pool." a 5% overage is not a huge deal. let's say the cardinals got $5m to spend in the top 10 rounds. if they go over by $200,000 (4%), they'd be taxed a further 75% of that $200,000, which would be $150,000. However, if they go over by more than 5%, they get the 75% tax AND they lose next year's first round draft pick. go over by 10% and the penalty is a 100% tax and loss of next year's first and second round picks. go over by 15% and you lose your first round pick next year and the year to follow. i read the graduated penalties as giving teams room for small errors or oversights, but imposing very stiff penalties for anything beyond minor discrepancies.

beyond the top ten rounds, you can give anybody a bonus of up to $100,000. anything beyond that counts against your pool fund.

what will be interesting to see is if teams game the system or, if they do, how they do so. as i said, the concept is that teams will pay slot in an orderly way. since there's a finite pool, any extra money you pay to one prospect must come out of the slot money dedicated to another. but that leaves room to shift salary from one slot to another or even not to sign a player in a given slot, in favor of giving money which should've gone to him to another draftee. (ed: this is incorrect. although it does not appear in the summary cited above, baseball america states that when a player fails to sign, the money for that slot comes out of the pool. this woud seem to make a ground-up negotiating process, starting with the 10th round player and moving up to ninth, etc. almost mandatory.)

will teams take a chance in later rounds on signability players and just fail to sign some other players? (ed: as noted above, they'd lose the slot money if a player failed to sign; however the team could draft 30th round talent in early rounds and offer them far below slot talent - or as one commenter at bucsdugout suggested, offer pittances to college seniors, to keep money for above-slot signings elsewhere). if next year's austin wilson falls to round 8 or even round 12, will some team get creative with their pool funds? i suspect most teams will follow the designed plan, since the risk of not doing so seems pretty high. however, some team may find an irresistable prospect falling in the draft and shift money around to sign him.

the signing deadline has moved up substantially (mid-july) to ensure that players sign fairly quickly -- which should be easy to accomplish, there being less room to negotiate as most teams will hew closely to slot offerings.

international draft

the international draft will be run in more or less the same way; clubs will be assigned a "pool" amound to spend how they like on the available international signees, and a similarly stiff penalty system for those who exceed the pool funds.

luxury tax and revenue sharing

the luxury tax cap will go from $178m to $189m in 2014. penalty taxes for exceeding the cap become progressively more serious each season the cap is exceeded, including 50% for clubs exceeding the cap for the fourth time.

the fifteen clubs in the largest markets will lose the right to participate in the revenue sharing plan.

employee governance and benefits

MLB will begin testing for HGH.

sexual orientation discrimination is now prohibited. we're still years away from a player coming out while actively on the field, if for no other reason than what opposing fans might do. but equivalent measures for coaching staff or umpires may be enacted, which could be helpful to those less in the public view.

chewing tobacco is banned in all team functions where the public or media may be present. it must be out of sight and cannot be on the person of the player.

no "low-density" maple bats may be used by new players. what? it's okay for scott rolen to get speared by matt holliday's broken bat, but not matt adams's? seniority has its privileges, i guess.

super-duper 100mph rated batting helmets must be used, but they're alleged to be less Dark Helmet-like than the monstrosity david wright was wearing a couple years back. in all seriousness, i'm very happy to see professional sports taking concussions more seriously. new helmet technology is overdue. still need to be careful around maikel cleto and aroldis chapman, guys.

league minimum salaries will rise from $414K to $480K this year, $490K next year, and $500K in 2014. dinner's on allen craig all spring training, guys!

increased instant replay for fair-foul calls and trapped ball-catch plays.

more international exhibitions.

oh, this is interesting. no more begging off the All-Star game, unless injured or excused by the Commissioner. if they want to put a policy with bite to it, they should have required that players actually be on the DL the day before or the day after the All-Star Break. "injured" =/= "on the DL." but yeah; bud selig is going to come round to your house and make sure you're not faking, like principal rooney in "ferris bueller's day off." blah blah, better health benefits, pensions, etc,. etc. it's important if you're a player, but not to the average fan.

A glut of work in my other life as Earnest MFA Student means I don't have anything interesting to report today, but in my defense neither have the Cardinals, so far—Roy Oswalt remains steadfastly unsigned and apparently displeased with the Cardinals' offer, although the Rangers, who apparently didn't want to start Oswalt in the first place, are supposedly out of the running.

I know the Rangers are rich and successful for the first time ever, but were they really chasing down a Hall of Very Good starter a year removed from a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 3.51 for the purposes of giving the rest of their admittedly strong rotation an extra night off every so often? That's just greed, the kind of greed that could be mitigated by, say, trading for Jake Westbrook, taking on all his salary, and using him as your swingman instead.

As for Edwin Jackson's signing, $10 million is good money on a one-year deal—just ask bereft, rapidly aging swingman Roy Oswalt—but it's right of the edge of where turning down three years, $30 million, as he reportedly did, makes sense. The longer he pitches on one-year deals, the more he risks exposing himself as someone who is excruciatingly tedious to watch.

Mainly, of course, I'm just in it for the draft pick.

On Tuesday I talked about how the Cardinals have built out their post-Pujols squad with veterans available on short-term deals, and in general I'm very excited about it; they've risked nothing more than the chance to sign Prince Fielder, and they've gained a team that looks ready to weather the worst year or two of the post-Albert-Pujols lull. They can do this, in part, because they were already prepared to spend $25 million on a thirtysomething with visible health problems; spending $30 million, instead, on Lance Berkman, Rafael Furcal, Carlos Beltran, and maybe Roy Oswalt is no particular risk by comparison.

But they'e also able to put themselves in this position because they have prospects to turn to after these players go back onto the market, another year or two older. Right now, this is what the Cardinals look like behind their Astros implants.

Lance Berkman—$12 million through 2012

Poor Allen Craig—apparently hitting .315/.362/.555 in 200 at-bats in the regular season and double-Pujolsing Alexi Ogando wasn't enough to guarantee him a full season in 2012, even though the starting right fielder was 35 and the starting first baseman is gone. He's clearly the first in line at first and in right, and given Berkman's huge career platoon split (1.009 against righties, .778 against lefties) and the likelihood of ex-Astro injury and positional jiggery-pokery he should significantly improve on his 2011 playing time regardless.

Or—second base. Someone tell Mike Matheny this isn't just a meme.

Past Craig there's Mark Hamilton, who should be sent to a nice farm somewhere where there aren't fifty other adequate first baseman on the depth chart ahead of and directly behind him, and Matt Adams, who will have to give us some reason to expect an above-average on-base percentage before he figures in the Cardinals' long-term plans as something more than a hedge against disaster. (Last year MLB first basemen hit .271/.345/.452, even in the Year of the Year of the Pitcher Story.)

Behind Adams is not very much—Jonathan Rodriguez put up a nice .251/.389/.472 line for the Midwest League at 21 and has a nice chance to be this year's Matt Adams, especially if he can get his strikeouts under control—which means the rest of the depth chart at first base is repurposed third basemen; it wouldn't surprise me at all to see Matt Carpenter or even Zack Cox get some at-bats there, if someone spends some time on the disabled list.

Rafael Furcal—$14 million through 2013

Pete Kozma's failure to thrive has done terrible things to the Cardinals' infield depth, which still looks a little peaked with Rafael Furcal standing on top of it. Tyler Greene is not quite so impressive in the Allen Craig role, but he's likely to see even more playing time in it, because Furcal and Daniel Descalso are not exactly brick walls at second and short.

Behind him things don't get any more impressive. Ryan Jackson hasn't proven he can't hit, yet, but .278/.334/.415 in the Texas League doesn't tell me much about what he can do, either; I'm still not convinced he's more than a replacement-level hitter at shortstop, and until we know what kind of great defense his great defense is he's hard to rely on.

Past that there's only Kolten Wong, who had a great half-season in the Midwest League and remains the Cardinals' best chance at a stable middle infielder by the time Furcal is gone.

Carlos Beltran—$26 million through 2013

Well, Allen Craig can only stand at one of these positions full-time; if Matt Adams impresses it's likely to be here, which would be excellent news for a Cardinals system that's lacked a really exciting bat since Colby Rasmus graduated.

Charlie Tilson and the 10 to 15 other speedy center fielders the Cardinals drafted last year are the nearest internal options, besides hoping that Thomas Pham will someday be able to play more than 50 games in a season; the Cardinals' outfield corners in the high minors were dotted, last year, with speedy non-hitters like Adron Chambers and Shane Robinson, non-prospects of all ages, and the kind of prospect that can be traded straight-up for Rafael Furcal. (Speaking of which, after his .322/.406/.603 month with Los Angeles's AA affiliate, Alex Castellanos is still stuck with a .239/.292/.389 ZiPS projection.)

It all makes me wish the Cardinals had managed to sign Kyle Russell, who at 25 hit .259/.342/.497 on that same Dodgers affiliate last year with 144 strikeouts in 394 at-bats. He's turned himself into Outfield Tyler Greene, combining nice speed and defense and enormous power with strikeouts in 32% of his plate appearances. It would be a fun sideshow, if not worth all the money he wanted out of that fourth-round pick back in the Kozma Draft.

Chris Carpenter, Kyle Lohse, and Maybe Roy Oswalt

The Cardinals' rotation is already really expensive right now, with or without Oswalt—they're due, right now, to spend $43 million on it, with the last $12 million year of Lohse the biggest expense. Luckily for the Cardinals, Lohse and Westbrook's production could be replaced for less money even if the Cardinals didn't have several top starting prospects on their way through the system.

Shelby Miller, 21 and putting up excellent AA numbers, is going to be difficult to keep in the minor leagues for a full season, and I doubt the Cardinals manage the trick. He's probably the Cardinals' fourth best pitcher right now. Behind him there's a firewall of pitchers who are probably better than replacement level as starters—Lance Lynn, Marc Rzepczynski—and behind them are Carlos Martinez and Tyrell Jenkins, who remain a few years away.

The Cardinals will have a lot of money coming off the rotation's books next year—even more if they outbid the Rangers for Oswalt's underpriced services—but thanks both to the weird collapse in veteran starter value and their increased rotation depth it looks like a lot of it won't need to be reinvested. Of course, if Adam Wainwright comes back looking like he never left a lot of that will be tied up in long-term contract questions.

Okay, first off, you should all stop worrying. I will be using the full force of my unleashed magic baron powers to ensure Roy Oswalt will be signed today. It's a Wednesday, I won't be around much, and there is a potential bit of news in the works. Come on, universe, don't let me down.

Third, I have absolutely no time at the moment for a full post. Now, ordinarily that sentence would indicate an 1800 word manuscript after the jump, as I tend to write far more when I'm strapped for time than I do on an ordinary day, but not this time. This time I really do need to keep this short, so that's exactly what I'm going to do.

Here is your discussion topic for the day, gentle readers:

The Cardinals look, at this moment, to be the strongest team in the NL Central. The loss of Albert Pujols certainly hurts, but the return of Adam Wainwright, plus the value of Carlos Beltran, has largely served to mitigate the falloff. The projections mostly see the Cards as a 90-92 win team, and that feels pretty accurate to me. They aren't far and away the best team in the division, mid-2000s style, but they are a very strong squad on paper.

I see the NL Central as a three-team race in 2012. The Cubs are still in the early stages of their rebuilding process, the Astros aren't going to be good until they've long since bid the NL adieu, and the Pirates, while intriguing, don't look like serious contenders just yet. They may make it to .500, but I don't think they're making any real noise in the division race this year.

So that leaves the Cincinnati Reds and the Brewers from The Good Land. The Brewers were the cream of the crop last year in the Central (until the playoffs, that is; suck it, Milwaukee!), while the Reds fell off from their 2010 pace to finish third. The Reds went out and picked up Mat Latos and Ryan Madson, while the Brewers lost Prince Fielder and a third of Ryan Braun. On paper the Brewer rotation is still better, with Yovani Gallardo and Zack Greinke still forming a remarkably potent one-two, but I do worry about Shaun Marcum going forward. The Reds have Latos and Johnny Cueto, but are also paying Bronson Arroyo an enormous amount of money to watch his chorus line leg kick and 82 mph meatballs.

Here's the question: which of those two teams are you more afraid of? The projections will tell you the Brewers are still a hair better than the Reds -- though I haven't seen any projections yet which specifically have Braun missing 50 games -- but I'm not so sure. Personally I fear the Reds a bit more, largely because I think Jay Bruce is going to have a big year. Not necessarily basing that on anything; call it a gut feeling. I also think Homer Bailey takes a step forward this season. He'll never be the ace we all thought he would be coming up, I don't believe, but I think he could be a solid 2.5-3.0 WAR starter if he could just get his home run rate under control. Of course, pitching in the Great American Bandbox doesn't really help on that front.

So that's my two cents. I think the Reds, not the Brewers, present the biggest threat to a Cardinal return to the playoffs in 2012. Really, it wouldn't take much good or bad to move the needle on any of these teams, as I think all three are fairly closely matched.

What do you think?

Next week I'll have another batch of scouting reports, and the week after that we'll do a Spring Training kickoff chat thread. Take care.

The Roy Oswalt news continues in its stagnant way—what we know as of this morning (and keeping in mind that the Cardinals would like nothing more than to make this post completely obsolete this afternoon) is that they and the Rangers are both interested and that the Cardinals are shopping Kyle McClellan. If it comes down to who can trade their swingman fastest, I have to think the Rangers have the advantage—Koji Uehara, who should probably be closing somewhere, has a strikeout-to-walk ratio of 10 in two years as a relief pitcher.

So we don't know whether Roy Oswalt or Jake Westbrook will be making 30 starts next year, but we do know that the Cardinals have made a choice as to their immediate post-Pujols future—one that is taking a fascinating advantage of the changing economics of baseball. As prospects and pre-arbitration players become more valuable, the Cardinals have counted their prospects, paid for Jaime Garcia, and plowed the Pujols dividend into a bunch of thirtysomething ex-Astros.

The Cardinals have given themselves two years to act like a big-market team with a bunch of expensive, potentially valuable players—the two years it should take for their top-tier farm system to mature.

I can't emphasize enough how impressed I am by John Mozeliak's work here. Without Roy Oswalt, here's the trick the Cardinals have pulled: They'll go from spending $95 million on veterans as old as Yadier Molina in 2012 to $60 million in 2013 to $17 million in 2014. It's not quite Albert Pujols, but it's an impressive bit of consumption smoothing for a team that was expecting to pay for Pujols and Matt Holliday for the next 10 years.

If everything works perfectly—and it probably won't—the Cardinals will have a chance to graduate Shelby Miller, Zack Cox, Kolten Wong, and whomever else might pop up on the cheap from the top prospect rankings. If everything doesn't work perfectly, the Cardinals will have a lot of money to play with on their next rebuilding attempt.

It's a big step up from what used to pass for reloading-not-rebuilding—Kyle Lohse, 2009; Jake Westbrook, 2011—and as a result I'm not sure how sustainable the current economics of baseball can be. At some point other teams are going to realize just how valuable nine Lance Berkmans in a row might be relative to one Prince Fielder for the nine years. But for now, from Rafael Furcal and Carlos Beltran to Roy Oswalt, the Cardinals have taken advantage of it.

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The Brewers sign Corey Patterson: I have to say, as glad as I am the Cardinals haven't signed Corey Patterson I'm a little disappointed the Brewers have decided to throw over last year's ex-top-prospect sixth outfielder, Jeremy Reed, for whom I've had a soft spot ever since he hit .373 in his first full season between high-A and AA back in 2003. Such is the allure of arbitrary end-points: If he'd hit .409 over 66 games out of 100 in AA he'd have just been a prospect, but since he hit that over his only 66 games in AA he was briefly a top one.

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Dmitri Young wants to call it a comeback: I don't know if I can ever remember Young 75 pounds under his last playing weight of 295, even when he was allegedly a third baseman, and as improbable as it is with players like Derrek Lee forced into near-retirement I'd love to see him make it back.

The Cardinals didn't really have anything left for him to do after the Mark McGwire acquisition, but I think it's still safe to call his trade, straight-up, for Jeff Brantley one of the misfires of the Walt Jocketty period. Brantley was already having shoulder problems when the Cardinals acquired him, and he was as combustible as you might imagine in 1998 before slipping awkwardly into retirement by 2001.

via www.thegrio.com

Earlier, we looked at the five best St. Louis Cardinals by rWAR from 1959 through 1988. This the follow-up to that post, which covers the time period from 1989 through 2011. This list is inspired by David Schoenfield's post on the ESPN Sweet Spot blog which looked at the five best position players by WAR. Unlike Schoenfield, I have included pitchers and ranked the five best Cardinals by rWAR.

1989-1993: Ozzie Smith, SS (20.6); Bob Tewksbury, SP (11.7); Milt Thompson, OF (9.0); Ray Lankford, OF (8.3); Bernard Gilkey, OF (7.6)

In these, his age 34-38 seasons, Ozzie continued to accrue numbers despite entering the normal decline phase for baseball players generally and middle infielders in particular. 1989 was likely Ozzie's second-best season. His defense was otherworldly according to Total Zone. He posted a 3.1 dWAR (!), which was almost half his value. With a batting line of .273/.335/.361/.696 (97 OPS+), Ozzie accrued 6.3 rWAR that year.

That Milt Thompson is third on this cumulative rWAR list tells us all we need know to about these years in Cardinals history. Rather than focus on Thompson, though, I wanted to mention the emergence of Ray Lankford. Over this time period, Lankford posted a line of .265/.346/.417/.763 (113 OPS+) and totaled 39 homers. In 1991, No. 16/12 led the league in triples and, in 1992, Lankford had the dubious distinction of leading the league in times caught stealing (24) and strikeouts (147). It won't be until the next five-year segment that Lankford emerges as the Lankford we (especially DanUp) remember fondly.

Tewksbury started 118 games over this timespan, totaled 813 IP, and posted a 3.13 ERA which was good for a 118 ERA+. All of this with opposing batters hitting for a .273 average against him. You, like me, are likely wondering how he managed this feat. It's because he barely walked anyone. Well, in 1989, he did (3.00 BB/9), but after that he was exemplary, posting BB/9's of 0.93 in 1990, 1.79 in 1991, and 0.93 in 1992. That's how he held opposing batters to a mere .297 OBP despite their .273 BA.

1994-1998: Ray Lankford, OF (23.6); Brian Jordan, OF (19.6); Mark McGwire, 1B (9.4); Matt Morris, P (7.2); Todd Stottlemyre, SP (6.5)

Lankford's age 27 through 31 seasons were everything you'd expect, a joyous mix of homers, walks, stolen bases, and strikeouts. Lankford posted a slash line of .282/.378/.523/.900 (135 OPS+), hit 127 homers, drew 381 walks, and struck out 632 over these five seasons. Overshadowed by The Great Home Run Race of 1998, Lankford had his best season in 1998. Lankford hit .293 with a .391 OBP and slugged .540. His .932 OPS was good for a 143 OPS+. Throw in roughly average defense and his 5.9 rWAR was a career best.

The Cardinals acquired Mark McGwire in 1997. In 1998, he rewarded them for having done so with one of the greatest seasons in baseball history. McGwire hit for a .299 average and led the league in OBP (.470), SLG (.752), OPS (1.222), OPS+ (216), walks (162), and, of course, home runs (70). That Sammy Sosa won the National League MVP award is a travesty. McGwire's 1998 was worth 7.2 rWAR. McGwire's production was so ridiculous and the Cardinals that preceded and surrounded him (not named Lankford or Jordan) so lackluster that he is ranked third on this cumulative rWAR list for the five season from 1994 through 1998 despite his only having played in St. Louis for one full season and a couple of months. Does anyone know when the Cardinals will install his statue outside of Busch?

1999-2003: Jim Edmonds, OF (27.7); Albert Pujols, IF/OF (23.6); J.D. Drew, OF (18.5); Edgar Renteria, SS (15.5); Mark McGwire, 1B (10.4)

Jim Edmonds did not play for the Cardinals in 1999. Over the four seasons from 2000 through 2003, he put together four of the six best seasons of his career (with the other top seasons coming in 2004 and 2005). Edmonds burst onto the St. Louis scene in 2000 with a 6.8-rWAR season and just kept hitting and fielding. Here are his OPS's over these five seasons: .994 (146 OPS+) in 2000, .974 (149 OPS+) in 2001, .981 (158 OPS+) in 2002, 1.002 (160 OPS+) in 2003. Here are his rWAR totals for the same years: 6.8, 6.4, 7.2 and 7.3. He also won four Gold Gloves that he was mostly deserving of with dWAR totals of 0.1, 0.5, 0.9, and 1.8.

Pujols places second on this list on the strength of three seasons. By now, we all know how ridiculous Pujols's career has been. Here are his OPS's from his first three seasons: 1.013 (157 OPS+), .955 (151 OPS+), and 1.106 (187 OPS+). Here are his rWAR totals: 6.9, 5.8, and 10.9. He won Rookie of the Year honors in 2001, a Silver Slugger, and placed fourth in the MVP voting. Pujols won the Silver Slugger for third base but could have won it for any number of positions as he played the outfield in 78 games for 611.2 innings, third base in 55 games for 431.2 innings, first base in 42 games for 287 innings. In 2002, Pujols's primary positions was left field where he played in 117 games for 870.2 innings but he also played third base for 293 innings in 41 games, first base for 144 innings in 21 games, and shortstop for two innings.

2004-2008: Albert Pujols, 1B (43.8); Jim Edmonds, CF (17.6); Scott Rolen, 3B (17.3); Chris Carpenter, SP (12.9); David Eckstein, SS (8.0)

To witness the MV3 season of 2004 was to live an entire summer constantly pinching oneself to see if it was a dream. It wasn't. Our trio of WARmongers really did lay waste to the National League in historic fashion. The numbers speak for that fireworks-filled season.

Chris Carpenter won the Cy Young in 2005. Carpenter threw 241.2 innings that season. While his IP total did not lead the league, his complete game total of seven did. Carpenter's 2.83 ERA was good for a 150 ERA+ and his peripherals were outstanding: 7.93 K/9, 1.90 BB/9, 2.90 FIP, and 2.93 xFIP. Carpenter pitched in only 2004, 2005, and 2006 for the Cardinals, missing the bulk of 2007 and 2008 due to injuries. Nonetheless, Carp still is the four-most valuable Cardinal during this five-year span.

2009-2011: Albert Pujols, 1B (21.7); Chris Carpenter, SP (12.8); Matt Holliday, OF (12.1); Adam Wainwright, SP (11.9); Yadier Molina, C (9.2)

Rather than five seasons, the final block of time is only three. Matt Holliday's rWAR total comes over about two and a half seasons wearing The Birds On The Bat. His line during that time is .314/.394/.543/.937. He has been elite but not Pujolsian. Despite declining production, Pujols is still a ridiculous talent. These last three seasons, his line is .313/.409/.598/1.007.

Adam Wainwright has only pitched in two of the three seasons that make up this cumulative rWAR exercise, yet his two-year 11.9 rWAR total is only 0.9 rWAR behind Carpenter's three-year total. This is a great indicator of just how excellent Wainwright was in 2009 and 2010. During those two seasons, he pitched 463.1 innings with a 2.53 ERA (157 ERA+) while posting a K/9 of 8.3 and BB/9 of only 2.4. His K/BB ratio was 3.48. The Cardinals' 2012 fortunes largely depend on the return of a healthy Wainwright, capable of dominating like he did prior to his elbow injury and corrective surgery.

It will be interesting to see whether Holliday, Carpenter, or Wainwright can surpass Pujols in rWAR by the end of 2013.

via www.throughthefencebaseball.com

A little while back, Dave Schonefield wrote a terrific post on ESPN's Sweet Spot blog, "Five Best Players in Baseball: A History." Using cumulative WAR for five-year periods, Schoenfield listed the five top players in Major League Baseball. The post inspired me to do something similar for the St. Louis Cardinals. Using Schoenfield's formatting, I began in 1959 (the eve of the El Birdos era, in a way) and worked forward to the present day.

If one is ranking the best Cardinals, one must include Bob Gibson. It's non-negotiable. However, Schoenfield's list included no pitchers, a fact that hardly seemed equitable to me. I began to wonder why this was. Was it because Fangraphs does not have pitcher WAR prior to 1974? Was it simply an exercise in position player valuation? Does Schoenfield have a problem an intermingling of pitchers and position players ranked by WAR? So, I used Baseball-Reference's WAR (rWAR) rather than Fangraphs WAR (fWAR) because Fangraphs lacks WAR prior to 1974. (Posts on WAR in general and the difference between rWAR and fWAR can be found here.)

This post was a fun trip down memory lane that produced some interesting results. I thought it would prove a fun late-winter read. But, it ballooned in size. Because of it's length, I cut it in half. The first half, which is below (and still rather long), covers 1959 through 1988. I decided it best to divide it after the conclusion of the Whiteyball era. The second half, covering the years 1989 through 2011 will be posted later.

1959-1963: Ken Boyer, 3B (29.7); Ernie Boglio, SP (19.4); Larry Jackson, SP (19.4); Bob Gibson, SP (13.8); Bill White, OF/1B (14.4)

Over this time period, Boyer was exemplary. He hit for average and power while also posting a walk rate of 10.2%. His slash line of .304/.375/.504 equaled a .384 wOBA. On top of this elite offensive production, Boyer also provided first-rate glove work at the hot corner. He was head-and-shoulders above his teammates during this five-year stretch.

Broglio was (in)famously traded mid-season in 1964 to the Cubs for Lou Brock. His rWAR total for the five years leading up to this trade shows why it didn't seem so bad at the time the deal was made. Broglio had quite a breakout during the 1960 campaign. His 21 pitching "wins" led the league and his 2.74 ERA was good for a 150 ERA+. Brolio placed third in the Cy Young voting and sixth in the voting for MVP that season. After a 4.12 ERA in the following season, he returned to form with an ERA of 3.00 in 1962 that equaled a 144 ERA+. In 1963, Broglio had another solid season with a 2.99 ERA over 250 IP. In 1964, Broglio had a 3.50 ERA for the Cardinals at the time of the trade and a 4.04 ERA for the Cubs over the remainder of the season, but then fell of a cliff with a 6.93 ERA over 50.2 IP in 1965 and a 6.35 Era over 62.1 IP in 1966. Broglio for Brock lives on in baseball infamy for the production of the players after the trade; before it, Broglio was pretty good for the Redbirds.

1964-1968: Bob Gibson, SP (34.0); Lou Brock, OF (21.9); Curt Flood, OF (19.1); Tim McCarver, C (15.7); Orlando Cepeda, 1B (10.5)

Bob Gibson's 34.0 rWAR led the Cardinals over this five-year period as well as all Major League pitchers. This should not be at all surprising to Cardinals fans who are well aware of the great Gibby's stunning accomplishments over the span of this golden era in the franchise's rich history: four All-Star Game appearances, four Gold Glove awards, a Cy Young, a National League Most Valuable Player award, and Major League Baseball lowering the pitcher's mound.

From 1961 through 1963, Lou Brock hit .258/.307/.392/.699 for the Cubs. At the time of his trade to the Cardinals for Broglio, he was hitting .251/.300/.340/.640. As a Cardinal over the remaining 103 games of 1964, Brock hit .348/.387/.527/.915 (146 OPS+). Brock would lead the league in stolen bases with 74 in 1966, 52 in 1967, and 62 in 1968. His best seasons were in the year of El Birdos and 1968. In 1967, Brock hit .299/.327/.472/.799 (127 OPS+) and accrued 5.1 rWAR. In 1968, the real Year of the Pitcher, Brock hit .279/.328/.418/.746 (124 OPS+) and led the league in doubles and triples as well as stolen bases. He again accumulated 5.1 rWAR that season.

1969-1973: Bob Gibson, SP (35.6); Joe Torre, C/3B (20.3); Steve Carlton, SP (16.1); Ted Simmons, C (13.1); Lou Brock, OF (12.2)

Gibson posted a 2.69 ERA (ERA+ of 137), which was better than the 134 ERA+ Gibby managed from 1964 through 1968. Relative to his pitching peers, Gibson was better from 1969 to 1973 than he was from 1964 to 1968--as reflected in his rWAR. Gibson put together an astonishing decade-long peak, as evidenced by the bronze plaque in Cooperstown, retired number, and red blazer.

Joe Torre put together an excellent five-year run for the Cardinals. Torre's best season was his MVP season of 1971. That season Torre posted 6.8 rWAR on the strength of an excellent offensive performance. Torre led the league in BA (.363), hits (230), total bases (352) and RBI (137). While his .976 OPS did not lead the league, it did equal an OPS+ of 171. His bat was worth 9.5 WAR but his glove was worth -2.6 WAR. His poor defense explains the seemingly low rWAR total given his superb offensive production.

Steve Carlton was traded after the 1971 season in one of the worst personnel decisions in franchise history. Even though his 16.1 rWAR represents only three seasons worth of production for the Cardinals. In 1972, his first season with the Phillies, Lefty won the first of his four Cy Young awards en route to accumulating 61.8 rWAR after leaving St. Louis.

1974-1978: Ted Simmons, C (23.9); Keith Hernandez, 1B (11.0); Bake McBride, OF (10.0); Bob Forsch, SP (9.9); John Denny, SP (9.9); Lynn McGlothen, SP (9.9)

I never saw Ted Simmons play, but I wish I had. From 1974 through 1978, the Cardinals catcher put up a .300 BA, .375 OBP, 468 SLG, .843 OPS and clubbed 86 homers. Simmons posted an OPS of .887 (142 OPS+) in 1974, .908 (144 OPS+) in 1977, and .889 (148 OPS+) in 1978. Even though his slugging dipped considerably in 1976, Simmons still managed a .371 OBP.

The three-way tie of pitchers that expands this five-year span's list to six is an interesting one. Despite accruing the same rWAR totals, Forsch pitched 975 innings to Denny's 729.2 to McGlothen's 681.1.

1979-1983: Keith Hernandez, 1B (24.1); Ken Oberkfell, IF (14.3); George Hendrick, OF (13.4); Gary Templeton, SS (9.8); Lonnie Smith, OF (9.2); Ted Simmons, C (8.7)

In 1979, Hernandez put up a monster season that won him the National League MVP. His .344 BA, 48 doubles (in cavernous Busch II), and 116 runs led the league. His .930 OPS was good for a 151 OPS+. Hernandez's 1980 season saw production at a similar level: .321/.408/.494/.902 (147 OPS+). His .408 OBP and 111 runs scored led the league. In 1981, the first baseman only made 444 Pas, but his slash line was still elite: .306/.401/.463/.864 (142 OPS+). In 1982, Hernandez again reached the 690-PA plateau and had another good season with a .299 BA and .397 OBP, but his SLG dropped to .413 which brought his OPS down to .810. After 55 games in 1983, the Cardinals traded him to the Mets.

That there are no pitchers in the top five rWAR totals for the timespan of 1979 to 1983 was surprising to me. Looking at the numbers, I became all the more thankful for the performances in 1982 by Joaquin Andujar and Bob Forsch. Andujar joined the Cardinals in 1981 and accrued 7.1 rWAR through 1983. 5.8 of that rWAR came in 1982 when he posted a 4.64 K/9, 1.69 BB/9, 2.47 ERA, and 2.87 FIP over 265.2 IP. Forsch accrued 7.1 rWAR over this five-year span and a full 2.7 of it came in that magical 1982 season. Even playing his home games in the pitcher-friendly Busch II, how Forsch did what he did with a 2.67 K/9 and 2.09 BB/9 is beyond me.

It should also be noted that 64% of Lonnie Smith's rWAR total from 1979-1983 came in the World Series championship season of 1982. I will also take this opportunity to note that Lonnie Smith was on the Cardinals during every season that Ozzie Smith wore a powder blue away jersey. This makes every powder blue throwback jersey that doesn't read "O. Smith" on its back historically inaccurate. During Ozzie's powder blue jersey days, the Cards had an "L. Smith" and an "O. Smith" but no one with just "Smith" on their jersey back. Majestic is swindling Cardinals fans with the historically inaccurate apparel they are peddling.

1984-1988: Ozzie Smith, SS (28.0); Willie McGee, OF (17.8); John Tudor, SP (16.1); Jack Clark, 1B (11.4); Tom Herr, 2B (11.3)

In 1987, Ozzie Smith had his greatest season. Ozzie posted the following line: .303/.392/.383/.775 (105 OPS+). He added exceptional defense worth 1.4 dWAR to this batting line and accrued 7.1 rWAR. The Cardinals won the pennant but Andre Dawson robbed The Wizard of what should have been an MVP award because the writers split the Cardinals vote between Jack Clark and Ozzie, who finished in second place.

Willie McGee's 1985 was truly exceptional. McGee led the league with a .353 BA, 18 triples, and 216 hits. (There was no BABIP back then, so I'm not going to mention it here.) He posted an OPS of .887 which was good for a 147 OPS+ and stole 56 bases with a success rate of 77.77%. Throw in his good defense and McGee fittingly accrued 8.5 rWAR for the season, which is slightly less than half of his five-year total.

Jack Clark arrived in St. Louis in 1985 and mashed. He posted an OPS of .895 that season which was good for a 149 OPS+. His production dipped due to injury in 1986 but The Ripper bounced back with a vengeance in 1987. He led the league in OBP (.459), SLG (.597), OPS (1.055), OPS+ (176), and walks (136). He also clubbed 35 dingers and drove in 106 runs. But Clark's season was cut short due to injury. Nonetheless, he amassed 6.5 rWAR that season and finished third in the MVP voting despite being more deserving of the award than its winner.

The five best St. Louis Cardinals by rWAR from 1989 through 2011 can be read here.

I've seen some commenters, here and elsewhere, discuss the idea of a six-man rotation should the Cardinals sign Roy Oswalt. What follows is a set of tables that should illustrate why this is a bad idea. The best way I can put the argument in simple terms is that a six man rotation gives fewer starts to better pitchers in exchange for worse pitchers. There's no real evidence that this keeps pitchers healthier but that is the argued advantage. There's some evidence that high pitch counts in individual games are dangerous to pitchers but less evidence that a high number of games are dangerous if the pitcher stays on their rotation.

The claims are difficult to refute because there is a lack of hard evidence since no team has had a six man rotation. What we can do is run the numbers on run prevention using projections like ZiPS to estimate pitcher talent and scale the number of innings each pitcher would get accordingly. So I admit that some of the claimed advantages of a six man rotation are difficult to refute but that is primarily because they can't be proven either. They are simply unfalsifiable. What I can show is that more innings to worse pitchers is a bad idea.

A few notes:

• FIP is being calculated from peripherals in Dan Szymborski's ZiPS projection system using a 3.2 league modifier.
• All starters are assumed to make 30 starts in a 5 man rotation with the remaining 12 starts going to a replacement pitcher (Lance Lynn in this case). Starters make 26 starts in a 6 man rotation with a replacement pitcher getting 6 starts.
  
• The bullpen is considered to be used the same under both circumstances with a replacement level reliever (Kyle McClellan) picking up any additional innings created in these scenarios. You can simplify this consideration by assuming that the innings per start for both Oswalt & Westbrook are equivalent. If you do the run totals don't effectively change since Westbrook's FIP projects the same as a middle reliever and he bumps a better reliever out of the bullpen. Literally nothing changes in that scenario, I've simply chosen to project Westbrook for fewer IP/GS than Oswalt.
  
• Innings per start are a combination of my judgment and ZiPS projected innings per start.

You can certainly argue with these caveats but, in order to get a six man rotation to be advantageous, you have to make some radically different assumptions about pitcher effectiveness and playing time.

The first scenario is if the Cardinals stick with a five man rotation and don't sign Oswalt (BO5 = Before Oswalt 5 Starters).

That is a total of 990 innings across 162 starts. We'll see later that 30 starts from a five man rotation that includes Roy Oswalt is going to pitch 15 additional innings in this hypothetical example but we'll assign those to Kyle McClellan our default middle reliever. Remember that when we're adding innings to the bullpen, it's likely that the good relievers are already pitching as frequently as they can so the lesser relievers will be taking on the additional starter's innings.

This set of starters will allow a total of 407 runs plus 7 runs coming from middle relief. That is 414 runs in a total of 1005 innings. Now lets look at the same set of starts if we put Roy Oswalt in and use a 6 man rotation. They will pitch 992 innings in this scenario and leave a middle reliever with 13 innings.

That is a total of 411 runs allowed. So if you sign Roy Oswalt and play a six man rotation you are essentially paying his entire salary for a 3 run upgrade. That's a hefty rate for less than half a win. The last scenario is after an Oswalt signing with a 5 man rotation (Jake Westbrook fades quietly into the night) and the rotation will accumulate 1005 innings so there will not be any additional middle reliever innings to account for.

This rotation yields 401 runs over 1005 innings. This is essentially a swap of Jake Westbook and Roy Oswalt. So we're talking about a 13 run upgrade.

(4.35-3.65) / 9 * 180 = 1.4

Take out the rounding errors and what we're seeing is that Roy Oswalt is a little more than a 1 win upgrade over Jake Westbrook. A six man rotation is not demonstrably better than a five man rotation with this set of pitchers. Additionally, this set of pitchers is something of a best case scenario for advocates of a six man rotation since all of the pitchers are above replacement level. For those teams with pitchers below replacement level (or just with worse pitchers in general) the penalty is far heavier since the gap between their pitchers talent level is greater than that between Adam Wainwright/Chris Carpenter/Jaime Garcia and Jake Westbrook.

As I'm filing this earlier and will be out of town for the remainder of the weekend, I won't have a chance to update this post if there is an actual Oswalt signing. I hope this serves as a dampener, however, to the idea of a six man rotation. The burden of proof resides with you to give some logical rationale or concrete numbers as to why the Cardinals would benefit from more starters.

A quick plug for Future Redbirds: Tomorrow will feature a question and answer session from John Vuch. Make sure and stop by.